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INTRODUCTION
By its very nature, a virus spreads, infects, festers, and devastates at
speeds difficult to understand.1 COVID-19, a virus the world has come to
know, reached the United States without stopping before it spread to the
very place dear to so many, home to Jazz music, gumbo, and a good time—
New Orleans, Louisiana.2 News stories of the virus infiltrated the lives of
Louisiana citizens.3 State and local governments rolled out mandates never
before exercised to reduce the spread of the virus.4 Schools closed.5
Businesses closed.6 Families drew close to one another.7 The world, the
state of Louisiana, and individuals alike reacted.8 Reaction, though it may
take many forms, is a natural human response to a crisis.9 When a
pandemic shatters the very threads of a community—through the effects it
has on their finances, their health, or their overall wellbeing—
communities not only search for information but also strive for solutions.10
No one can deny that COVID-19 has impacted the lives of so many in the

1. See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CDC, https://www.cdc.gov
/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/LTK23T4S] (last updated Sept. 1, 2020).
2. See Coronavirus (COVID-19), LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://ldh.la.gov/
Coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/GQS2-W7HP] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Covid-19 News, LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://ldh.la.gov/index.cfm/
newsroom/category/227 [https://perma.cc/Y99U-DDRS] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
6. Id.
7. See generally Mark Ballard & Sam Karlin, Louisiana issues statewide
stay-at-home order to combat coronavirus spread; see details here, ADVOCATE
(Mar. 22, 2020, 1:47 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/
coronavirus/article_922869e8-6c6d-11ea-aeee-6b6fd5e8f4bd.html [https://perma
.cc/66ER-AQ83].
8. Covid-19 News, supra note 5; Ballard & Karlin, supra note 7.
9. Covid-19 News, supra note 5; Ballard & Karlin, supra note 7.
10. Covid-19 News, supra note 5; Ballard & Karlin, supra note 7.
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world. In the Louisiana community, the pandemic has proven ever so
incessant.11
Sadly, COVID-19 is not the only crisis this state and the rest of the
country face.12 A different sort of virus continues to infest, fester, and
devastate—addiction.13 Addiction, as those individuals with personal
experience can attest, spreads as easily and with as much impact as
COVID-19.14 Just like the virus, addiction does not discriminate based on
the color of your skin, the neighborhood you grew up in, your
undergraduate GPA, or even how hard you may fight against it.15 Viruses
and addiction do three things, and they do it exceptionally well— attack,
destroy, and attack again.16 Bleak as it may sound, there are lessons to be
learned from the devastating nature of COVID-19, chief of which is to
react.17 The affected communities have taken numerous selfless measures
to protect themselves and their loved ones during this pandemic. The
addiction crisis deserves the same relentless response.18
The opioid epidemic has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of
Americans since the early 2000s.19 Determining the party responsible for
this epidemic captured the public’s attention when state and local
governments began litigation against pharmaceutical companies,
physicians, and medical distributors.20 Asking who is responsible for the
crisis is an important and necessary step to take in healing the nation that
has been so affected by this crisis.21 Bringing suit against these actors to
determine their responsibility merely initiates the rebuilding of the

11. Covid-19 News, supra note 5; Ballard & Karlin, supra note 7.
12. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drug
overdose/data/index.html [https://perma.cc/2JZM-9ENG] (last updated March
19, 2020); Debra Bruno, The Opioid Litigation Wars, WASH. LAW., Jan./Feb.
2020, at 15–18.
13. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12; Bruno, supra note 12.
14. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12; Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), supra note 1.
15. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12; Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), supra note 1.
16. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12; Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), supra note 1.
17. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12; Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), supra note 1.
18. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12; Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), supra note 1.
19. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12; Bruno, supra note 12.
20. See generally Bruno, supra note 12.
21. Id.
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communities devastated by addiction.22 If the plaintiffs are successful in
the litigation, state and local governments will then be asked to develop
and execute a strategic allocation of the funds they receive from the
litigation.23 Ensuring that programs designed to rehabilitate devastated
communities, fight against the ongoing epidemic, and prevent future ones
are sufficiently available, adequately well-funded, and effectively applied
must be the priority of local and state governments.24
Louisiana faces a particular dilemma over the allocation of settlement
proceeds.25 Louisiana’s dilemma involves the allocation of settlement
proceeds to hundreds of local actors combatting the opioid epidemic
plaguing the state.26 In the near future, a settlement resulting from both an
ongoing state suit and federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) involving the
opioid epidemic will present Louisiana with a choice. The decision can be
either to react to the whims and wants of certain plaintiffs or to plan a
proactive approach to the allocation of settlement proceeds that meets the
needs of citizens affected by the opioid crisis.27 In hopes of facilitating a
settlement, the opioid MDL consolidates pending federal lawsuits to
process complex cases and streamline pretrial motions.28 When litigants
come together, settlement becomes an ideal course of action.29
In addition to the state’s involvement in the opioid MDL in federal
court, Louisiana also filed a state suit against opioid manufacturers in 2017
that is still pending.30 Moreover, the crisis impacted the lives of Louisiana
citizens and drained major funding from the state and local governments
through costs such as court-administration expenditures from opioid
criminal cases; the costs of distributing drugs that reverse opioid
overdoses; increases to police, fire, and EMS budgets to handle the rise in
opioid overdoses; Medicaid and Medicare coverage of patients with opioid
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sam Karlin, As opioid lawsuits balloon in Louisiana, potential settlement
dollars face these complexities, ADVOCATE (June 30, 2019, 8:45 AM),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/politics/article_928d11c8-99d1
-11e9-9447-abbab61f21fa.html [https://perma.cc/495S-LQLR].
26. Id.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018); Karlin, supra note 25.
28. Karlin, supra note 25.
29. Colin Dwyer, Your Guide To The Massive (And Massively Complex)
Opioid Litigation, NPR (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/10/15/761537367/your-guide-to-the-massive-and-massively-complex
-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/J7HN-UQLP].
30. See generally Karlin, supra note 25.
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addiction; grants and subsidies to safety net hospitals serving communities
that the opioid crisis affected; grants and subsidies allocated to local drugtreatment centers; and criminal prosecution and enforcement costs.31
According to Louisiana’s Department of Health, the state’s healthcare cost
for opioid abuse—only one portion of the government’s expenditures—is
approximately $296 million per year.32
At such a high economic and social cost, Louisiana’s involvement in
the opioid litigation is sensible.33 The question of where to allocate
settlement dollars will be a major issue for Louisiana because of the varied
involvement of parish, city, and state actors, as well as the diverse range
of affected population groups in the state.34 The large number of plaintiffs
involved in both the opioid MDL and the state lawsuits against the
manufacturers and distributors makes this wave of litigation
unprecedented. Further, the division of potential settlement or award
proceeds is uncertain.35 Louisiana lacks procedural devices that mandate
the proper and efficient allocation of the settlement funds from the opioid
MDL.36 The Louisiana Legislature enacted laws in reaction to the growing
opioid-addiction epidemic in the state;37 however, the current opioid
31. See generally Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the
Opioid Crisis on Local Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and
Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061, 1119 (2019).
32. LA. COMM’N ON PREVENTING OPIOID ABUSE, LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, THE
OPIOID EPIDEMIC: EVIDENCE BASED STRATEGIES LEGISLATIVE REPORT 17,
http://ldh.la.gov/assets/docs/BehavioralHealth/Opioids/LCPOAFinalReportPkg2
0170331.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFV-GHZR].
33. Id.
34. Karlin, supra note 25. The diverse range of affected population groups
include providers of addiction treatment, treatment of neonatal abstinence
syndrome and birthing facilities, and educational programs for prescriber training.
See LA. COMM’N ON PREVENTING OPIOID ABUSE, supra note 32.
35. Nicolas P. Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, 70 S.C. L. REV. 637,
658 (2019).
36. Karlin, supra note 25.
37. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1001–14; 40:978.1; 40:203.10; 40:1024 (2020). In
2017, the Louisiana Legislature passed statutes implementing a prescription
monitoring program in response to Louisiana’s status as a high prescribing state.
From 2014 to 2016, Louisiana expanded access to an opioid-overdose medication,
naloxone. The Louisiana Good Samaritan Law provides that a person who seeks
care for an individual who is suffering from an emergency—in this case, an opioid
overdose—is free from prosecution despite evidence of the “possession of a
controlled dangerous substance.” Id. In 2017, the Louisiana Legislature expanded
state law to allow the implementation of local needle exchanges in cities, towns,
or parishes. Id.
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litigation presents an opportunity to act proactively and ensure timely and
fair allocation of the settlement proceeds.38
Louisiana has a history of ignoring local concerns such as public
health rehabilitation, as its participation in the Tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement (MSA) illustrates.39 A look at Louisiana’s experience with this
MSA demonstrates the need to be proactive when dealing with matters of
public health because the Tobacco MSA failed to set aside a certain
percentage of the settlement funds for public health rehabilitation.40
Specifically, if the opioid MDL settlement fails to require communities to
invest a significant portion of the funds in public health programs, then the
MDL plaintiffs should tailor their portion of the settlement to the particular
needs of the communities and mandate that a majority of the settlement
funds go to initiatives for medication-assisted treatment.41 Local
governments should design these programs to encourage a proactive
approach to the public health crisis.42 They can then distribute the
remaining funds to replenish their depleted budgets.43 The settlement must
guarantee an efficient yet fair allocation of the money that Louisiana
obtains through opioid litigation.44 The key to success lies in the Louisiana
plaintiffs’ ability to construct a settlement so as to impart to impacted
individuals a sense of justice.45

38. See infra Part III; Karlin, supra note 25.
39. See generally Nicolas Terry & Aila Hoss, Opioid Litigation Proceeds:
Cautionary Tales from the Tobacco Settlement, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 23, 2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180517.992650/full/ [https://per
ma.cc/3NHZ-NPPV].
40. Id.
41. See generally Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31; Medication-Assisted
Treatment Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www-aws.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/11/medication-assisted-treatment-improves-out
comes-for-patients-with-opioid-use-disorder [https://perma.cc/GVG8-PUJP].
42. See generally Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31; Medication-Assisted
Treatment Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
43. See generally Terry, supra note 35, at 645; LA. COMM’N ON PREVENTING
OPIOID ABUSE, supra note 32; Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31.
44. See generally J. TRAVIS MCILWAIN, LA. SENATE, TOPS FUND AND
TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, http://senate.la.gov/Tops/Presenta
tions/TOPS_MSA_Task%20Force%20SUMMARY%20FINAL.pdf [https://perm
a.cc /3PCN-TQL3].
45. See generally Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31; Medication-Assisted
Treatment Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note
41.
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Part I of this Comment provides background on the opioid crisis in the
United States and on state and local governments’ efforts to place
responsibility on the manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.
Further, Part I introduces the rise of opioid litigation and the shift to a
national focus on the role of the court in settlement negotiations. Part II
details the pending opioid MDL in Ohio and the state case of Oklahoma v.
Purdue Pharma L.P. Additionally, Part II describes Louisiana’s role in the
opioid MDL litigation, as well as the state’s general goal in the litigation.
Part III illustrates and discusses how the opioid crisis had a heightened
effect on Louisiana and argues that Louisiana’s response to the crisis was
improper. Indeed, Part III examines Louisiana’s history of ignoring local
interests in developing public-health rehabilitation. Particularly, Part III
studies Louisiana’s ineffective response to the Tobacco MSA. Part IV
recommends that Louisiana avoid repeating its history and suggests that
the plaintiffs in the opioid litigation, particularly Louisiana local
governments, use a majority of the settlement proceeds to fund
rehabilitation programs for those individuals with opioid addiction.
I. PUTTING A PRICE ON OPIOID ADDICTION
Americans regularly die from overdoses involving prescription and
illicit opioids.46 The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reports that the
number of opioid overdose deaths has quadrupled since 1999.47 Currently,
130 Americans die every day from an opioid overdose.48 Although an
estimated 2 million Americans, ages 12 and up, are addicted to opioids,
only 400,000 people receive treatment at a specialty facility.49
Opioids, a class of drugs found in a plant called “the opium poppy,”
target the brain to induce the effect of pain relief.50 There are three
46. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin., Key Substance Use
and Mental Health Indicators in the United States: Results from the 2018 National
Survey on Drug Use and Health, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2019),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHNational
FindingsReport2018/NSDUHNationalFindingsReport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/UD7D-6X5N].
50. Opioids include legal prescription medications and illegal drugs such as
heroin. See Michael J. Malinowski, The U.S. Science and Technology “Triple
Threat”: A Regulatory Treatment Plan for the Nation’s Addiction to Prescription
Opioids, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 1027 (2018); Opioid Addiction, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/opioids/what-are-opioids.html [https://perma.cc
/4X2N-KHW4] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
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categories of opioids: (1) natural opioids, (2) synthetic opioids, and (3)
heroin.51 Natural opioids include morphine, codeine, oxycodone,
hydrocodone, hydromorphone, and oxymorphone.52 Synthetic opioids are
methadone, tramadol, and fentanyl.53 The last category, heroin, an illegally
made street drug, is created from morphine.54
The CDC characterizes the opioid epidemic in terms of “Three Waves
of Opioid Overdose Deaths.”55 In the 1990s, the first wave included an
increase in opioid prescriptions that led to an increase in prescriptionrelated opioid overdoses.56 Second, heroin-related overdoses rapidly
increased beginning in 2010.57 Finally, the third wave involved syntheticoverdose deaths, which rose above both heroin and prescription-related
opioid deaths in 2013.58 A basic understanding of opioids reveals that
multiple drugs, not one predominant drug, caused the current opioid crisis;
however, prescription drugs largely initiated the crisis.59
A. The Opioid Crisis in the United States: Americans in Pain and the
Healthcare Industry’s Response
The use of opioids involves a serious risk of addiction.60 Although
addiction differs for each individual, some studies show that physiological
effects may occur anywhere between the first dose and as little as two
weeks.61 For many years, doctors were neither aware of the risks
associated with addiction, nor did they believe that opioids were
addictive.62 Nevertheless, the medical profession now recognizes opioid
addiction as a serious disorder that leads individuals to use opioids in a
manner that is harmful to their physical and mental health.63 Many people
obtain a pleasurable feeling from the pain-relieving effect of the drug,
which often leads to a craving for more opioids.64 Additionally, opioids
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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induce a physiological response of dependence.65 Dependence on an
opioid drug causes withdrawal when an individual stops taking it, which
often leads to the misuse and possible overdose.66
In 2018, the CDC collected and published the most recent data
available detailing the rise in opioid addiction.67 The CDC statistics
concluded that “two out of three drug overdose deaths in 2018 involved
an opioid.”68 Further, the CDC also found that since 1999 over 750,000
people have died from opioid overdose.69 In 1999, the report identifies a
major increase in drug-related deaths, at the same time as the rise of
prescription opioids began.70 Those calculations include all types of
opioids; however, the CDC reported that “32% of those deaths involved
prescription opioids.”71 Further, over 70% of the people who died from
opioid overdose were previously prescribed legal opioids.72 Indeed,
research states that some patients are unwilling to accept prescription
opioids regardless of their pain level, out of fear of becoming addicted to
the drug.73

65. Id.
66. Linda Gowing et al., Buprenorphine for managing opioid withdrawal,
COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS. 3 (2017) (“The signs and symptoms of
the opioid withdrawal syndrome include irritability, anxiety, apprehension,
muscular and abdominal pains, chills, nausea, diarrhea, yawning, lacrimation,
sweating, sneezing, rhinorrhea, general weakness and insomnia. Symptoms of the
opioid withdrawal syndrome usually begin two to three half-lives after the last
opioid dose, that is, 6 to 12 hours for short acting opioids such as heroin and
morphine, and 36 to 48 hours for long acting opioids such as methadone.
Following cessation of a short half-life opioid, symptoms reach peak intensity
within two to four days, with most of the obvious physical withdrawal signs no
longer observable after 7 to 14 days. . . . The first, or acute, phase of withdrawal
is followed by a period of six months or so of a secondary or protracted
withdrawal syndrome. This protracted syndrome is characterised by a general
feeling of reduced well-being which is reflected in measurable abnormal
physiological functioning.”).
67. See Opioid Overdose: Data Overview, supra note 12.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Amid Opioid Crisis, Insurers Restrict
Pricey, Less Addictive Painkillers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/09/17/health/opioid-painkillers-insurance-companies.html [https:
//perma.cc/Y2UW-SHNU].
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In 2018, the CDC compiled the Drug Surveillance Report on opioid
prescribing patterns and statistics.74 Among the entire population of the
United States, 17.4% of people filled at least one prescription for an opioid
as directed by a physician in 2018.75 The worrisome data includes the
escalating rates of prescriptions as each year passes.76 Although the
national average is very high, some states surpass others in opioid
prescribing rates.77 Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Tennessee have the highest rates of opioid prescriptions in America.78
A steady rise of prescription-opioid deaths occurred from 1999 to
2016.79 It is also important to note that a dramatic increase in deaths from
synthetic opioids other than methadone also occurred.80 This demonstrates
that though many factors are at play in the current public health crisis, it
mainly followed the steady rise in prescription opioid usage.81 Overall, the
national data on opioid addiction indicates that the rise in prescription
opioids is associated with the rise in the use of synthetic and illicit
opioids.82
B. The Opioid Crisis in the United States: Americans Looking for
Someone to Pay
The cost of the opioid crisis is nothing less than astronomical, and
cities, counties, and states are looking for someone to pay.83 Estimations
of the costs that have accrued since 2001 range from $50 billion to over
$1 trillion.84 Further, commentators predict that the costs of healthcare,
74. CDC, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE
REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES—UNITED STATES (Aug. 31,
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/pubs/2018-cdc-drug-surveillancereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BH2-FHVD] [hereinafter 2018 ANNUAL
SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES—UNITED
STATES].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 11.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND
OUTCOMES—UNITED STATES, supra note 74.
83. Dwyer, supra note 29.
84. Id. (“These numbers can be tough to pin down, but one thing isn’t in
dispute: Between the costs of health care, criminal justice, lost productivity and
addiction treatment programs, agencies at every level of government have
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criminal justice, and addiction-treatment programs will amount to another
half trillion this year.85
In response to this addiction crisis, various state and local
governments have filed lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and
distributors.86 Claims against opioid manufacturers include marketing the
widespread use of opioids and minimizing the risks of addiction and
overdose.87 Moreover, claims against opioid distributors include failing to
notice, investigate, or report suspicious orders.88 The plaintiffs seek
damages and penalties for the amounts they have paid because of
excessive opioid prescriptions.89 Beginning in the late 1990s, the
manufacturers aggressively advertised opioids to a broader range of
patients than before, and physicians began prescribing at much higher rates
than before.90 The issue in the opioid litigation is whether the
pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors are responsible for the
opioid epidemic.91
II. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HEAR THE CALL TO ACTION
Louisiana state and local governments are plaintiffs in several actions
against opioid manufacturers and distributors.92 Although the state
government’s suit has not advanced since beginning in 2017, Oklahoma
brought a similar lawsuit against the same defendants in 2019.93
Understanding Oklahoma’s experience with this litigation provides
valuable insight into Louisiana’s possible legal theories and potential
success.94
combined to lose tens of billions of dollars trying to combat the crisis. A study
published by the National Institutes of Health in 2013 placed the national
economic burden at $78.5 billion. With roughly 70,000 people dying annually
from drug overdoses—more than half of them related to opioids—today’s cost is
likely far higher. Others have placed the financial effects at anywhere from around
$50 billion to upward of $1 trillion since 2001, with another half-trillion projected
by 2020.”).
85. Id.
86. Dwyer, supra note 29.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Oklahoma ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, at *4,
(Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019); Karlin, supra note 25.
93. Karlin, supra note 25.
94. Id.
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A. Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma L.P.
The success of the Oklahoma state government in Oklahoma v.
Purdue Pharma L.P. provides some context for the legal claims of
plaintiffs in both the federal opioid MDL and state suits like Louisiana’s.95
The Oklahoma government brought a state claim for public nuisance
against opioid manufacturers Purdue Pharma L.P. and Johnson & Johnson
for their roles in marketing, promoting, and selling the drugs in the state.96
The nation closely watched the case because it was the first opinion to be
on record during this wave of opioid litigation.97 On August 26, 2019, the
parties reached a $572 million settlement, which surpassed a previous
settlement that Oklahoma reached with another pharmaceutical company
and which “raise[d] the stakes” in opioid litigation.98 Notably, the
Oklahoma district court found that the manufacturers strategized to
increase awareness that prescription opioids were the key to addressing
undertreated chronic pain.99
The Oklahoma opinion accounted for the branded and unbranded
marketing efforts “designed to reach Oklahoma doctors through multiple
means and at multiples times over the course of the doctor’s professional
education and career in Oklahoma.”100 The pharmaceutical companies
trained their salespersons to market the drugs “through the use of
‘emotional selling’ for opioids by convincing physicians that pain was
harming patients.”101 The manufacturers developed the term
“pseudoaddiction” to persuade physicians that any indication of addiction
was not, in reality, a sign of addiction.102 Instead, the manufacturers
recommended that doctors prescribe more opioids to patients who
95. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, at *4.
96. Id. (“In Oklahoma, nuisance law is defined by statute 50 O.S. 1981 § 1,
defines a nuisance as follows: A nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or
omitting to perform a duty, which act or omission either: First. Annoys, injures or
endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others; or Second. Offends
decency; or Third. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or
renders dangerous for passage, any lake or navigable river, stream, canal or basin,
or any public park, square, street or highway; or Fourth. In any way renders other
persons insecure in life, or in the use of property, provided, this section shall not
apply to preexisting agricultural activities.”).
97. Oklahoma Judge Orders Johnson & Johnson to Pay $572M for Opioid
Abatement, MEALEY’S EMERGING DRUGS & DEVICES (Aug. 26, 2019).
98. Karlin, supra note 25 (quoting Professor Margaret Thomas).
99. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CJ-2017–816, at *10.
100. Id. at *4.
101. Id. at *10.
102. Id. at *11.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 334

12/2/20 7:03 AM

2020]

COMMENT

331

exhibited such symptoms.103 Multiple pamphlets, internet sites, and sales
pitches instructed physicians and patients on the exaggerated benefits of
opioid drugs.104 The court identified the manufacturer’s distribution of
misleading marketing materials in Oklahoma as a major contributor to the
state’s high rate of physicians prescribing opioids.105 Noting that “the
increase in opioid addiction and overdose deaths following the parallel
increase in opioid sales in Oklahoma was not a coincidence,” the court
found the necessary causal link to connect the opioid crisis to the
manufacturing companies under Oklahoma’s public nuisance law.106
Oklahoma law does not limit the doctrine of public nuisance laws to
property issues.107 Precedent from the Oklahoma Supreme Court includes
corporate activity in the definition of what constitutes public nuisance.108
Specifically, the doctrine describes nuisance as “any act which annoys,
injures, endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others, or in any
way renders other persons insecure in life or in the use of property.”109 The
state district court held that Oklahoma met its burden of proving the
elements of the public nuisance statute when it found that the
manufacturer’s actions were a cause-in-fact of the state’s injuries, meaning
the manufacturers “engaged in false and misleading marketing of both
their drugs and opioids generally.”110
Further, the court approved the state’s proposed abatement plan for
one year.111 The plan outlines the targeting programs and funds necessary
to abate the opioid crisis in Oklahoma, totaling $572,102,028.112
Oklahoma tailored its abatement plan to meet the state’s needs.113 Johns
Hopkins, the White House, the Oklahoma Commission, the Surgeon
General, and the CDC developed best practices and gathered the data that
the state relied on in creating its abatement plan.114 The Oklahoma lawsuit
103. Id.
104. Id. at *11–13.
105. Id. at *19.
106. Id. at *20.
107. Id. at *22.
108. Id. at *23.
109. Id.
110. Id. at *26, *29.
111. Id. at *30.
112. Id. at *41.
113. Id. at *30.
114. Id. at *31. The state chose to focus on the prevention and treatment of,
and recovery from, opioid-use disorder. Specific examples of programs and costs
include (1) biopsychosocial assessment available to residents in need of treatment,
which costs $232,947,710 per year; (2) supplementary services, which cost
$31,796,011 per year; (3) public medication and disposal programs, which cost
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provides an example of plaintiffs succeeding against the opioid
manufacturers and distributors.115 Louisiana’s state suit and its opioid
MDL will likely follow a similar strategy.116
B. Federal Opioid MDL
The ongoing opioid MDL in federal court addresses the responsibility
of pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors for the opioid crisis.117
The opioid MDL encompasses over 2,000 lawsuits that “cities, towns,
counties, Native American tribes, labor unions and a host of others”
brought and consolidated in Ohio federal court.118 Local governments
initiated this federal lawsuit and are the plaintiffs in the litigation.119 Courts
agreed to consolidate the cases in Ohio for three main reasons: (1) the
presiding judge, Judge Polster, has extensive knowledge and experience
in MDL cases; (2) the opioid crisis greatly affected the state; and (3) Ohio
is a convenient forum for many of the defendants.120
$139,883 per year; (4) enabling enrollment in the Screening, Brief Intervention
and Referral to Treatment program (SBIRT), which costs $56,857,054 per year;
(5) pain prevention and on-opioid management therapies, which cost
$103,277,835 per year; (6) expanded and targeted naloxone distribution, which
costs $1,585,797 per year; (7) medical case management and consulting, which
costs $3,953,832 per year; (8) developing and disseminating treatment standards
and quality improvement for neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), which costs
$107,683,000 per year; (9) funding NAS as a required, reportable condition,
which costs $181,983 per year; (10) implementing universal substance-use
screening for pregnant women and enabling all OB/GYN practices to enroll in
SBIRT practice dissemination program, which cost $1,969,000 per year; (11)
medical treatment for infants suffering from NAS or opioid withdrawal, which
costs $20,608,847; and (12) Oklahoma law-enforcement agencies, licensure
boards, and Oklahoma Office of the Chief Medical examiners, which cost
$11,101,076 per year. Id. The court approved the state’s proposed abatement plan
for one year. Id. The plan details the targeting programs and funds necessary to
abate the opioid crisis in Oklahoma, totaling $572,102,028. Id. However, this plan
only outlines the strategy for one year, and it is sure to incur many obstacles along
the way. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally Karlin, supra note 25.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Courtney Hessler, Consolidation of 66 Opioid Suits Requested, HERALD
DISPATCH (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/consolidationof-opioid-suits-requested/article_9c4df826-c6a6-58fd-9ba8-ac6058aaf2ad.html
[https://perma.cc/6L7N-MT2G].
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On September 11, 2019, the Eastern Division of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio approved the Negotiation
Class.121 The Ohio district court appointed 49 representatives of the
Negotiation Class, including the City of Baton Rouge/East Baton Rouge
Parish, Louisiana.122 Many Louisiana parishes filed suit in this federal
case.123 Judge Polster remains focused on settlement as the end goal of the
opioid MDL.124 To avoid any delays, the Ohio district court set a timeline
dictating termination of the negotiating class five years from September
11, 2019.125
The Louisiana local governments that filed the MDL lawsuit seek to
recover funds that they have paid in addressing the opioid crisis.126
Questions of the amount of any settlement and the division of funds loom
in the background of the negotiations.127 The plaintiffs allege that the
manufacturers did not accurately portray the risks of using their opioids
and that the distributors did not properly screen or notice suspicious
121. National Prescription Opiate Litigation, U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. OF OHIO,
https://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804
[https://perma.cc/94TY-2RLN].
Frequently Asked Questions, IN RE: NAT’L PRESCRIPTION OPIATES LITIG.,
https://www.opioidsnegotiationclass.info/Home/FAQ [https://perma.cc/NWH8-8
Z7R] (“The purpose of the Negotiation Class is to create a cohesive group of cities
and counties to negotiate Classwide settlements, on a voluntary basis, with
Defendants who make, distribute, or sell opioids nationwide. Class Representatives
and Class Counsel will represent the Negotiation Class. Class Members will vote
on any Class settlement proposal. If 75% of those Class Members who
vote . . . support a proposed Settlement, Class Counsel will ask the Court to approve
it. The ultimate purpose of the Negotiation Class is to make settlement easier to
obtain. . . . This is a new use of the Class action mechanism under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, reflecting the unique nature of the national opioids litigation.
Unlike any mass litigation before, thousands of cities and counties nationwide are
pursuing claims against major defendants. The goal is to recover money to help fight
the opioids epidemic, provide prevention and treatment services going forward, and
change Defendants’ practices.”). Most Louisiana Parishes are involved. To see a
complete list of parties involved, use the following link and click on docket # 2591:
http://www.opioidsnegotiationclass.info/ [https://perma.cc/3RAT-VCLP].
122. National Prescription Opiate Litigation, supra note 121.
123. In Re: National Prescription Opiates Litigation, NPO LITIG.,
http://www.opioidsnegotiationclass.info/ [https://perma.cc/3RAT-VCLP]. Most
Louisiana Parishes are involved. To see a complete list of parties involved, use
the following link and click on docket # 2591: http://www.opioidsnegotiation
class.info/ [https://perma.cc/3RAT-VCLP].
124. National Prescription Opiate Litigation, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. Karlin, supra note 25.
127. Id.
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orders.128 Despite the issues surrounding the complexity of the claims, it
is important to focus on the unprecedented number of plaintiffs because
that number affects the distribution of settlement proceeds.129 The quantity
of plaintiffs multiplied quickly in September when Judge Polster decided
to create a Negotiation Class.130 Further, the plaintiffs alleged inconsistent
damages because the opioid crisis affected the different plaintiffs in
varying degrees.131 Also, the concept of allowing lawyers from 49 local
governments to negotiate a settlement deal as representatives of all cities
and counties in the litigation is an innovative notion, as the size of this
lawsuit is unprecedented.132 If the plaintiffs reach a settlement with the
defendants, the Negotiation Class will then vote to approve it.133 If they
approve with enough votes, and Judge Polster also agrees to the deal, then
the agreement will be binding on all parties.134 As this type of settlement
procedure in an MDL has never happened before, there is no example
model.135
Deciding how to divide the settlement among a state’s cities, counties
or parishes, and tribal authorities presents a difficult legal issue.136
Although state governments are not plaintiffs in the federal opioid MDL,
37 attorneys general unsuccessfully attempted to disrupt the plan to form
the Negotiation Class, as they felt that the class would diminish their
bargaining power with the opioid manufacturers and distributors.137 State
governments likely feared that an MDL settlement between local
governments and opioid manufacturers and distributors may exhaust the
defendants’ funds before any chance of settlement in the state cases.138
Consequently, issues concerning settlement allocation exist between state
and local governments.139 Overall, the large number of plaintiffs with
diverse goals creates a significant challenge to the settlement of the case.140
Conflicts of interest are sure to occur.141 Accordingly, the terms of the
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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settlement must adequately address the issue of the allocation of settlement
proceeds.142
Louisiana has a particular interest in ensuring a fair allocation of these
proceeds, as the state ranks as one of the most affected in the crisis.143
Certainly, Louisiana’s history of ignoring local interest in the 1998
Tobacco MSA will make the fight for proper allocation that much more
contentious.144
III. LOUISIANA’S NEED FOR PUBLIC HEALTH REHABILITATION AND ITS
HISTORY OF IGNORING LOCAL CONCERNS
Louisiana is a great candidate to establish a careful plan to distribute
the settlement funds in a manner designed to assist as many affected by
opioid addiction as possible. Another hurdle, however, exists for
Louisiana:145 the state’s history of ignoring local governments in large
settlements, most notably during the Tobacco MSA.146 The opioid crisis
significantly affected Louisiana, costing the state millions of dollars in
healthcare costs.147 The plaintiffs in the opioid MDL bore much of the
costs of taking care of their constituents suffering from opioid addiction.148
Louisiana also used funds to supply resources for programs targeting the
crisis.149 Louisiana’s healthcare and criminal-justice costs continue to rise
exponentially despite legislative efforts in response to the opioid
epidemic.150 Therefore, Louisiana has a need for the plaintiffs to
implement a proactive plan for the settlement allocation.151

142. Dwyer, supra note 29.
143. BUREAU OF HEALTH INFORMATICS, LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, LOUISIANA
OPIOID SURVEILLANCE INITIATIVE (Mar. 2019), http://ldh.la.gov/assets/oph/CenterPHI/Opioid_Files/NFLIS_White_Paper_062819.pdf [https://perma.cc/82TU-45EY].
144. Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
145. Id.; Dwyer, supra note 29; Karlin, supra note 25.
146. Terry & Hoss, supra note 39; LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:98.1–:99.20 (2019).
147. BUREAU OF HEALTH INFORMATICS, supra note 143; LA. COMM’N ON
PREVENTING OPIOID ABUSE, supra note 32.
148. National Prescription Opiate Litigation, supra note 121; Dwyer, supra
note 29.
149. Dwyer, supra note 29.
150. Id.
151. Terry & Hoss, supra note 39; Karlin, supra note 25.
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A. Louisiana: An Ideal Model for Conflict over Settlement Allocation
Louisiana’s opioid prescription rate is among the highest in the United
States.152 In fact, Louisiana physicians wrote 89.5 opioid prescriptions for
every 100 people in 2017, although the national average was 58.7.153
Further, evidence shows a correlation between Louisiana’s high
prescription rate and opioid-induced deaths.154 The number of overdose
deaths included over 450 Louisiana citizens in 2018, marking a 13.5%
increase from 2017.155
Although Louisiana reported a decrease in prescription opioid deaths
in recent years, the state has not been spared from the cost of the crisis.156
Louisiana’s public health crisis is not limited to prescription opioids.157
Indeed, the use of fentanyl, heroin, natural and semi-synthetic opioids, and
synthetic opioids caused a substantial rise in deaths from 2014 to 2018.158
Louisiana’s unique status as a highly affected state is the result of more
than higher-than-normal prescription rates and overdose rates.159 Further,
Louisiana did not have programs in place to specifically combat the public
health crisis of rampant opioid addiction among its citizens until the
Louisiana Legislature acted in 2017—more than five years after the opioid
epidemic first impacted the state.160 Therefore, Louisiana is in need of a
proactive process to ensure the most effective results.
B. Louisiana’s Delayed Response to the Growing Opioid Crisis
In 2017, Louisiana enacted multiple statutes to reduce the harm caused
by the opioid crisis.161 Certainly, these measures were distinct from
Louisiana’s traditional mode of criminalizing drug use.162 For example,
152. OPIOID STEERING COMM., LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, LOUISIANA’S OPIOID
RESPONSE PLAN 5 (2019), http://ldh.la.gov/assets/opioid/LaOpioidResponsePlan
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4T2-6L6R].
153. 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND
OUTCOMES—UNITED STATES, supra note 74.
154. Id.
155. OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1001–14, 40:978.1, 40:203.10, 40:1024 (2019).
161. Id.
162. Jonah Seligman, Comment, Confronting a Crisis: An Appraisal of
Legislation in Louisiana Combating the Opioid Epidemic, 93 TUL. L. REV. 148,
157 (2018). The Louisiana Legislature “signal[ed] a paradigm shift in state drug
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the opioid crisis pushed the Louisiana Legislature to implement programs
and policies such as opioid prescription monitoring programs, naloxone
distribution and access, immunity from prosecution for people who report
drug-related emergencies, and needle exchange programs.163 The
legislature implemented these programs after the crisis began significantly
affecting Louisiana, which further underscores the state’s trend of reactive
legislation.164
In 2017, the Louisiana Legislature passed statutes implementing a
prescription monitoring program in response to Louisiana’s status as a
high-prescribing state.165 The program restricts first-time opioid
prescriptions for acute pain to a seven-day supply.166 Additionally, the
statute requires prescribers to report any prescription of a controlled
substance.167 The statute also mandates that healthcare providers complete
continuing education on prescribing practices.168 Louisiana’s legislature
enacted several prescription monitoring statutes to develop, implement,
operate, and evaluate “an electronic system for the monitoring of
controlled substances and other drugs of concern that are dispensed in the
state.”169 The program functions to alert prescribers of possible opioid
abusers without disrupting the efficient practice of medicine.170
The question of whether the monitoring program fulfills its purpose
remains unanswered.171 The Louisiana Department of Health maintains a
digital database that is easily accessible to those wishing to find
policy—a move away from a longstanding criminalization model toward an
embrace of harm reduction strategies.” Id. The traditional mode of criminalization
included “decades of punitive drug laws—whose enforcement failed to prevent or
even mitigate the current calamity—rooted in the erroneous notion that substance
abuse and misuse are moral failings.” Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1002.
166. Id. “Acute pain usually comes on suddenly and is caused by something
specific. It is sharp in quality. Acute pain usually does not last longer than six
months. It goes away when there is no longer an underlying cause for the pain.”
Acute v. Chronic Pain, CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://my.clevelandclinic.org
/health/articles/12051-acute-vs-chronic-pain [https://perma.cc/SQ2A-JF3P] (last
visited Nov. 8, 2019).
167. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1002.
168. Id. §§ 40:1006–08.
169. Id. § 40:1002.
170. Id.
171. See Louisiana Opioid Data and Surveillance System, LA. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, https://lodss.ldh.la.gov/ [https://perma.cc/DAW3-6MS4] (last visited
Sept. 25, 2019).
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information on the effectiveness of the legislation.172 The interactive site
shows a major decrease in the number of opioid prescriptions from 2014
to 2018, indicating the relative success of the legislation.173
Despite the relative success of the prescription monitoring program,
more needs to be done. Research shows that efforts to monitor the
frequency of prescribing behavior have fallen short of curbing the risk of
long-term addiction.174 Further, current data suggests that patients are at
risk of long-term addiction after five days of taking opioids.175 Notably,
the seven-day supply limit does not consider this finding from the
research.176 Overall, the prescription drug-monitoring program reduces the
amount of opioid prescriptions; however, this reduction occurred after
addiction was already reaching a peak in the state. It would have been
more effective to implement the program before addiction spiked in
Louisiana.177 In addition to the prescription drug monitoring program, the
Louisiana Legislature took steps to combat deaths from opioid
overdose.178
From 2014 to 2016, Louisiana expanded access to naloxone, a
medication that reverses opioid overdoses.179 The statute implementing
this access authorizes emergency responders, friends, and family to
administer the antidote if an individual is suffering from an overdose.180
The naloxone law is an important and necessary step to reducing the
number of opioid deaths; however, naloxone does not aid in the long-term
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Anuj Shah et al., Characteristics of Initial Prescription Episodes and
Likelihood of Long-Term Opioid Use—United States, 2006–2015, CDC:
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov
/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6610a1.htm [https://perma.cc/4FYN-Q255].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1001–14 (2019); Louisiana Opioid Data and
Surveillance System, supra note 171.
178. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:978.1.
179. Id.
180. See Act No. 192, 2015 La. Acts 1539 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §
40:978.1); Act No. 370, 2016 La. Acts 1307; REBEKAH E. GEE, LA. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, STANDING ORDER FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OR DISPENSING OF NALOXONE
OR OTHER OPIOID ANTAGONISTS (Jan. 7, 2019), http://ldh.la.gov/assets/docs/Be
havioralHealth/Opioids/Naloxonestandingorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/88Y6-CJAF];
REBEKAH E. GEE, LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, STANDING ORDER FOR THE DISTRIBUTION
OR DISPENSING OF NALOXONE OR OTHER OPIOID ANTAGONISTS (Jan. 8, 2019),
http://ldh.la.gov/assets/docs/BayouHealth/Informational_Bulletins/17-01/IB17-1_re
vised_1.16.18 .pdf [https://perma.cc/A3PW-AFTD].
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care or rehabilitation of opioid addicts.181 Also, in 2017 Louisiana
legislators enacted laws allowing the implementation of local needle
exchanges in cities, towns, and parishes.182 Needle exchange programs
allow for the safe disposal of used needles in exchange for clean needles.183
The purpose of the program is to reduce harm from the reuse of needles.184
The state authorized needle exchange programs to avoid risks, like HIV,
involved with injecting drugs.185
Although these laws seek to combat Louisiana’s opioid crisis, the state
implemented the programs as reactionary measures around 2017.186
Opioid addiction in Louisiana reached significant levels by 2012, but some
data indicates a much earlier date, as a rise in prescription opioids dates
back to 1999.187 Reactive programs are no doubt important, but they often
do little but damage control, as seen with the programs above.188 For
example, the most effective time to implement a prescription monitoring
program was in the 1990s when physicians began prescribing opioids at a
significantly higher rate.189 Although the Louisiana Legislature enacted
statutes to address opioid addiction, the crisis is still unfolding in
Louisiana.190 Louisiana failed to responsibly ensure the welfare of its
citizens ahead of time and only acted in response to the crisis.191 Louisiana
has a duty to act efficiently and equitably to ensure this situation does not
happen again.192 If Louisiana had laws in place to safeguard public health
prior to crises like rampant opioid addiction, then the problem might not
have developed into the epidemic it is today.193 Instead, the legislation that

181. Jed Lipinski, Overdose: What Happens When the Medics Arrive,
NOLA.COM (May 25, 2016), https://www.nola.com/entertainment_life/health_fit
ness/article_d40955ac-f8bb-559b-ae91-f453db959d32.html [https://perma.cc/LD4
D-Q6Y2].
182. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1024.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA:
THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 4–11
(2016), https://addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/surgeon-generalsreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BRF-TG3A].
186. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1001–14, 40:978.1, 40:203.10, 40:1024.
187. Louisiana Opioid Data and Surveillance System, supra note 171.
188. Id.
189. OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152.
190. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1001–14, 40:978.1, 40:203.10, 40:1024.
191. Seligman, supra note 162, at 158; OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152.
192. Seligman, supra note 162, at 158; OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152.
193. Seligman, supra note 162, at 158; OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152.
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Louisiana enacted had minimal success in mitigating the crisis.194 The
lesson to be learned from Louisiana’s response to the opioid crisis is that
reactive policies are necessary responses to the community’s needs, but
there is also a need for proactive laws and programs to be put in place
before a crisis begins.195
The state may not be able to go back in time to be more proactive, but
the settlement of the opioid litigation will provide Louisiana with an
opportunity to address public health concerns in a comprehensive manner
by supporting programs that will be directly and meaningfully responsive
to real lives consumed by addiction and that will assist in preventing the
next public health crisis from happening.196 With settlement proceeds
potentially coming from the opioid MDL, Louisiana has a chance to
maximize fair allocation and best utilize the proceeds.197 Louisiana must
combat its tendencies and avoid an unrepresentative settlement of the
opioid litigation, like that of the Tobacco MSA.198
C. Fear of Repeating History: The Tobacco MSA
Louisiana’s experience in the Tobacco MSA reveals the state’s custom
of disregarding local need for public health rehabilitation programs.199 In
the early 1990s, the country learned that tobacco companies purposefully
disguised and fostered cigarette addiction.200 Subsequently, 46 states and
6 jurisdictions filed lawsuits against the tobacco industry.201 The states
argued that the tobacco industry should pay for the enormous healthcare
and prevention costs of smoking-related diseases like lung cancer and

194. Seligman, supra note 162, at 158; OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152.
195. Seligman, supra note 162; OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152.
196. Seligman, supra note 162; OPIOID STEERING COMM., supra note 152;
Louisiana Opioid Data and Surveillance System, supra note 171.
197. Louisiana Opioid Data and Surveillance System, supra note 171.
198. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:98.1–:99.20 (2018); Louisiana Tobacco
Settlement Fund Amendment, BALLOTPEDIA.ORG (Oct. 1999), https://ballot
pedia.org/Louisiana_Tobacco_Settlement_Fund_Amendment_(October_1999)
[https://perma.cc/2ZSV-NV5W].
199. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:98.1–:99.20; Louisiana Tobacco
Settlement Fund Amendment, supra note 198. An MSA is the result of a large
settlement agreement, whereas an MDL is a complex litigation mechanism.
200. Paul L. Keenan, Death by 1000 Lawsuits: The Public Litigation in
Response to the Opioid Crisis Will Mirror the Global Tobacco Settlement of the
1990s, 52 NEW ENG. L. REV. 69 (2017).
201. Id.
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heart disease.202 States alleged various legal theories, including public
nuisance, false advertising, and antitrust violations.203
The courts never assessed the legitimacy of these claims because in
June 1997, the plaintiffs proposed legislation that offered $368 billion over
25 years as settlement for the claims.204 The legislation would have granted
the Food and Drug Administration regulatory power and imposed
restrictions over the tobacco industry.205 The tobacco industry lobbied to
prevent the proposal from passing, as leaders in the industry negotiated
another settlement with state attorneys general.206 Ultimately, the parties
entered a $246 billion settlement that tobacco companies would pay over
a 25-year period.207 Additionally, the tobacco companies reached a $40
billion settlement with the four states that did not join the settlement.208
At that time, the Tobacco MSA was the largest civil-litigation
settlement in history.209 The MSA directed payments to the states as
reimbursement for taxpayer money spent on healthcare expenses linked to
illnesses associated with cigarettes and smoking.210 In exchange for
limited liability, the tobacco industry agreed to pay initial payments,
annual payments, and bonus payments to cover the costs of litigation.211
Further, the companies agreed to limit the sale and advertising of their
products.212 The state and local governments and the procedure of masstort litigation prompted the tobacco industry to payout instead of enduring
additional litigation in the future.213
Some indicators of the marginal success of the MSA include the
reduced rate of cigarette smoking, restrictions on tobacco marketing, and

202. 15 Years Later, Where Did All the Cigarette Money Go?, VPR (Oct. 13,
2013, 5:52 PM), https://www.vpr.org/post/15-years-later-where-did-all-cigarettemoney-go#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/V263-GH4L].
203. Keenan, supra note 200.
204. See Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the
Public Welfare: Lessons from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 WIDENER L.
REV. 159, 164–67 (2011).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 762–63 (2003).
208. Id.
209. Keenan, supra note 200.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 345

12/2/20 7:03 AM

342

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

increased cash flow for the states.214 Conversely, the MSA was not
completely successful because it did not dictate how states ought to allocate
their spending.215 Instead, states made spending decisions entirely on their
own.216 Consequently, many states used only a portion of the funds on public
health programs and funneled the rest into general funds, resulting in only
$11.5 billion spent on public health or tobacco-related programs from 1999
to 2018.217 Further, despite the CDC’s recommendation that states allot $3.3
billion for tobacco prevention, research shows that by 2018 states allocated
$721.6 million on average, “less than one-quarter of the recommended
amount.”218
D. Fear of Repeating History: Louisiana’s Experience with the Tobacco
MSA
Louisiana participated in the Tobacco MSA, and the state allocated
funds in the irresponsible manner described above.219 Louisiana did not
use the majority of its funds to combat the public health issue of smoking
tobacco.220 Louisiana voted to “allocate[] seventy-five percent of tobacco
monies to a trust fund providing college scholarships, funds for school
districts, and health programs.”221 Louisiana’s experience in the Tobacco
MSA reveals the state’s history of disregarding local need for public health

214. Fifteen Years After the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement: Successes
and Challenges, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., https://www.naag.org/publications
/naagazette/volume-7-number-11/fifteen-years-after-the-tobacco-master-settle
ment-agreement-successes-and-challenges.php [https://perma.cc/W7PQ-UZBB]
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
215. Shital A. Patel, The Tobacco Litigation Merry-Go-Round: Did the MSA
Make it Stop?, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 615, 658–63 (2005); see also Fifteen
Years After the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement: Successes and
Challenges, supra note 214.
216. Patel, supra note 215; see also Fifteen Years After the Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement: Successes and Challenges, supra note 214.
217. See C AMPAIGN FOR T OBACCO -F REE K IDS , T OTAL A NNUAL S TATE
TOBACCO PREVENTION SPENDING: FY1999–FY2018, https://www.tobaccofree
kids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/settlement/FY2018/FY2
018_state_settlement_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQS2-73DV].
218. Keenan, supra note 200.
219. Id. at 90.
220. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:98.1–:99.20 (2019); see also
Louisiana Tobacco Settlement Fund Amendment, supra note 198.
221. Terry, supra note 35.
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rehabilitation programs.222 The allocation of the MSA resources reflects a
diversion from the intended public health efforts that the litigation aimed
to promote.223
The opioid litigation has the potential to result in a settlement like the
Tobacco MSA.224 The claims, strategy, and public health elements are
substantially similar.225 In the opioid litigation, as in the tobacco litigation
before, the plaintiffs’ claims focus on the responsibility of the industry.226
For example, the plaintiffs in both cases sought reimbursement for
healthcare costs, investment in prevention services, and development of
rehabilitation programs.227 Further, both sets of plaintiffs strategically
chose to use mass-tort litigation to force industry response.228 The use of
mass-tort litigation captures the attention of large industry actors because
of the risk of massive liability.229 Lastly, the purpose of both sets of
litigation is public health rehabilitation.230 The addiction to smoking
produced tobacco-related diseases that greatly affected the country.231
Similarly, the opioid crisis resulted in a major rise in drug overdose deaths
in the United States.232 Public health rehabilitation is a central theme in the
two groups of litigation.233 Therefore, it is logical to predict that Louisiana
will respond to the inevitable opioid settlement in a way that is similar to
how it responded to the tobacco settlement.234
Louisiana’s response to the Tobacco MSA was to funnel funds away
from the public health issue of tobacco addiction.235 Although Louisiana’s
allocation of the funds into educational programs substantially aided the
state and filled gaps in the state’s budget, Louisiana cannot follow the path
222. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:98.1–:99.20; Louisiana Tobacco
Settlement Fund Amendment, supra note 198.
223. Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement
and Its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later, 137 CHEST 692, 697 (2010).
224. Esmé E. Deprez & Paul Barrett, The Lawyer Who Beat Big Tobacco
Takes On the Opioid Industry, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/features/2017-10-05/the-lawyer-who-beat-big-tobacco-takes-onthe-opioid-industry [https://perma.cc/GU9H-4VPP].
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Keenan, supra note 200.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See generally Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
235. Terry, supra note 35.
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of the Tobacco MSA in the opioid settlement.236 In October 1999, Louisiana
citizens voted to amend the Louisiana Constitution to allow for the
investment of 75% of settlement funds into “a trust fund for college
scholarships, local school districts and health programs.”237 Also, Louisiana
enacted Revised Statutes §§ 39:98.1–:99.20 to set forth the legislation
required to distribute and invest settlement money from the Tobacco
MSA.238 The fund is tied to a tax on cigarette sales in the state, which means
that as tobacco sales decline or increase, the money channeled into the fund
also declines or increases.239 Unlike the tax on cigarette sales, the opioid
settlement will likely not result in any tax on opioid drugs because of their
nature as medical necessities in some cases.240
In 2011, another amendment to Louisiana’s constitution rebalanced
the distribution of the tobacco settlement.241 Voters adopted this
amendment as a way to put more funding into the Taylor Opportunity
Program for Students (TOPS) Fund.242 The amendment caused the state
government to reallocate the settlement payout when the Millennium Trust
reached $1.38 billion.243 The new allocation funneled 75% of the
settlement funds—all from the Education Excellence Fund and the Health
Excellence Fund—to the TOPS Fund.244
Although the tobacco litigation was a response to a public health issue,
Louisiana took the unique approach of reallocating the settlement funds to
a program unrelated to the origination of the money.245 Louisiana voters
continually support the existence of and funding for TOPS, as
demonstrated by the 2011 constitutional amendment; however, TOPS is a
state-run program that does not achieve the purpose of combatting the
public health issue that the tobacco litigation sought to resolve246
Louisiana’s treatment of the Tobacco MSA demonstrates that the state
has a history of failing to reinvest damages in public health initiatives.247
Given the outcome of the Tobacco MSA, one might reasonably expect that
236. Id.
237. Louisiana Tobacco Settlement Fund Amendment, supra note 198.
238. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 39:98.1–:99.20 (2019).
239. Id.
240. See generally Terry, supra note 35.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Louisiana Tobacco Settlement Fund Amendment, supra note 198; Dwyer,
supra note 29.
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something similar could happen with the opioid settlement.248 The
Tobacco MSA serves as a lesson that if the plaintiffs in the opioid litigation
want to see the purpose of their suit fulfilled, they should explicitly
mandate in the settlement that the funds go toward public health
rehabilitation.249 Without such specific language, local governments,
municipalities, and other state plaintiffs have every reason to fear that state
legislation could take settlement funds awarded to ameliorate the opioid
epidemic and divert them away from the programs designed to aid in
fighting Louisiana’s opioid crisis.250
IV. LOUISIANA’S KEY TO A JUST AND EQUITABLE OPIOID SETTLEMENT
ALLOCATION: DISTINGUISH HISTORY AND PLAN FOR THE FUTURE
The Louisiana local governments involved in the opioid MDL will
likely reach a settlement with opioid manufacturers and distributors.251
Judge Polster, the judge presiding over the opioid MDL, will have to
approve the settlement, apportioning an award of damages to each
plaintiff.252 Ideally, the settlement will include a provision specifying the
division of proceeds.253 This provision should require that local
governments invest the majority of the damages into public health
rehabilitation programs and allocate the remaining amount to cover costs
that local governments have already paid.254 If the settlement does not
contain such a provision, then local governments should act to ensure that
the settlement allocates funds in this manner.255 Importantly, those
litigants leading the discussion and decision-making on the opioid MDL
settlement must distinguish the current opioid litigation from the tobacco
litigation to develop a just and equitable allocation of the former’s
settlement funds.256 If the local governments mandate settlement
allocation to treatment programs for opioid use, then they will successfully
248. See Dwyer, supra note 29; Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
249. See Dwyer, supra note 29; Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
250. See Dwyer, supra note 29; Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
251. See Karlin, supra note 25.
252. See Dwyer, supra note 29; Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
253. See Dwyer, supra note 29; Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
254. See Dwyer, supra note 29; Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
255. See Dwyer, supra note 29; Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
256. See Beth Connolly, Louisiana Expands Access to Addiction Treatment,
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www-aws.pewtrusts.org/
en/research-and-analysis/articles/2019/08/27/louisiana-expands-access-to-addict
ion-treatment [https://perma.cc/UVX7-G6VJ]; Medication-Assisted Treatment
Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
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accomplish two goals: (1) supply their constituents with resources to
combat the opioid crisis and (2) proactively implement a program
designed to not only mitigate the current addiction crisis, but also prevent
another one from occurring.257
A. Step 1: Distinguish Opioid Litigation from Tobacco Litigation
Despite the similarities between the tobacco litigation and the opioid
litigation, there are differences between the two.258 These critical
differences involve doctrinal and evidentiary variance.259 Those parties
deciding the division of the settlement need to be aware of the differences
to make a just and equitable allocation.260 Specifically, there are three key
distinctions that set the opioid litigation apart: (1) the small number of
defendants and their financial limitations; (2) the complication of illicit
drugs; and (3) the status of local governments as the plaintiffs rather than
states.261
1. The Small Number of Defendants and Their Financial Limitations
The opioid litigation has fewer defendants than the tobacco litigation,
and those defendants have less resources than their tobacco counterparts.
Therefore, the local governments must act strategically to ensure a just and
equitable allocation of the settlement funds.262 Unlike the massive tobacco
industry, whose sales in 2016 amounted to $94.4 billion, prescription
opioid sales only reached $8.5 billion in the same year.263 Collectively, the
opioid industry does not produce near the revenue that the tobacco industry
makes today.264
Furthermore, Purdue Pharma L.P. and Johnson & Johnson are the sole
defendants in the opioid MDL, whereas there were many more defendants
in the tobacco litigation.265 The opioid settlement will be far less
comprehensive because of the size of the industry and of the resources of
the limited number of defendants. Additionally, Purdue Pharma L.P. filed
257. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
258. See Keenan, supra note 200.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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for chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2019, in an effort to protect
the company and its owners from liability.266 The governments can argue
that “police authority to protect their citizens permits them to override the
bankruptcy protections claimed by [the owners of Purdue Pharma
L.P.].”267 Local governments may also have an argument that the
company’s owners moved billions of dollars into “shell corporations and
private accounts,” allowing the plaintiffs to “pierce the bankruptcy shield
against litigation.”268 Still, the defendants’ capital is an issue. Therefore,
the massive payout that plaintiffs received in the tobacco litigation is
unattainable over such an extended period in the opioid litigation.269 Some
commentators suggest that this difference in capital might explain why
some cities opted out of the opioid MDL in hopes of a larger settlement.270
The size of the plaintiff class and the financial limitations of the defendants
are significant differences between the two classes of litigation, but it is
not the only variance between them.
2. The Complication of Illicit Drugs
The tobacco litigation identified a clear route to the cause of tobacco
addiction—the tobacco industry.271 The tobacco industry utilized a directto-consumer marketing strategy that made it easier for plaintiffs to
designate the industry as the cause of the addiction crisis.272 By contrast,
the prescription opioid crisis does not have an isolated industry to place
blame upon.273 A licensed medical professional had to first prescribe the
opioid for it to reach the consumer. The issue of the medical profession’s
liability is an ongoing matter. Although the crisis began with prescription
opioids, the use of illegal opioids perpetuated it, complicating the
determination of the ideal distribution of settlement funds.274
Although the opioid manufacturers and distributors are partly
responsible for the opioid crisis, local and state governments must also
266. Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of
OxyCotin, Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/09/15/health/purdue-pharma-bankruptcy-opioids-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/V25A-6F7L].
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Malinowski, supra note 50.
273. Id.
274. See Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
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confront the use of illegal opioids.275 Research shows that the use of illicit
opioid drugs typically begins with developing a dependence on legally
prescribed opioids.276 Still, questions exist as to whether the settlement
funds should be distributed only to repair the damage from opioids, or
whether funds should be distributed to combat future damages that include
abuse of illicit opioids.277 Commentators and scholars reasonably fear that
true recovery from the opioid crisis requires more than a recovery of
damages already caused.278 Instead, governments will need to conduct
research that targets programs that have been successful at rehabilitation
and will likely continue to be successful with more funding.279
3. The Local Governments are the Plaintiffs—Not the States
State governments formed the Negotiation Class in the tobacco
litigation.280 By contrast, it is local governments consolidating their claims
in the opioid MDL. Accordingly, the opioid settlement funds must focus
on local needs rather than state needs.281 The plaintiffs in the opioid
litigation are a multitude of cities, counties or parishes, and tribal
authorities.282 The opioid crisis caused the plaintiffs to experience different
losses at different rates.283 The variations in loss create a large problem
with settlement division and budget planning among local governments.284
Further deepening the division issue, data is not readily available on the
impact of the opioid crisis on local government. Researchers recently
began quantifying the effect and found that local governments incurred
major costs in an attempt to fulfill their responsibility to constituents
affected by the opioid crisis.285 To develop a representative and just
allocation of the settlement proceeds, each local government should
publish data on its spending on opioid-related programs.286 The
publication must include data that reflects the individual local
275. Id.
276. See 2018 ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS
AND OUTCOMES—UNITED STATES, supra note 74.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See Keenan, supra note 200.
282. Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
283. See Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.

348056-LSU_81-1_Text.indd 352

12/2/20 7:03 AM

2020]

COMMENT

349

government’s expenditures on opioid-related issues throughout the
crisis.287
For example, local governments likely incurred court-administration
costs to track crimes associated with opioids.288 The local governments can
also produce documentation of naloxone costs because local entities paid
for “the cost of acquiring and storing the drug as well as training
employees on its use.”289 Although the state and federal government bears
the bulk of healthcare costs associated with the opioid crisis through
Medicare, Medicaid, and other health plans for state or federal employees,
local governments usually pay for gaps in coverage by compensating local
hospitals for services provided to the indigent.290
Still, calculating the costs of the opioid crisis on local governments
remains a difficult task, as most research combines the local costs with the
state costs.291 Separating the two sets of costs is important to compute an
accurate and representative division of the settlement funds, especially
because many state governments have also filed separate lawsuits against
the opioid manufacturers and distributors.292 State governments will also
need to calculate the costs that they have suffered as a result of the crisis.293
Undoubtedly, state governments will want local governments to divert
settlement funds back to the state to recoup any money that local
governments received from the state to serve affected citizens.294 If the
state governments want to be repaid, then local governments could use this
repayment to their advantage.295 For example, state governments control
Medicaid spending.296 As proposed in the next section, medicationassisted treatment programs could benefit from an expansion of Medicaid
coverage of therapy drugs such as buprenorphine.297 State governments
should direct any settlement proceeds they collect from local governments

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1116.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31; Medication-Assisted Treatment
Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
296. See Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31; Medication-Assisted Treatment
Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
297. See Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31; Medication-Assisted Treatment
Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
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to the state budget’s coverage of these highly effective drugs instead of
using the funds to fill gaps in the budget.298
The Louisiana budget, like most state budgets, can always benefit
from more money.299 Some commentators argue that Louisiana should
repeat its history in the Tobacco MSA and allocate funds back to
education.300 The local government will have the choice to invest the
money in any area of their budget that they deem appropriate.301
Alternatively, local governments could use a majority of the funds to fill
budget holes, following the logic that Louisiana should fix what it already
has in place instead of developing new programs.302 Nevertheless,
community leaders will also have the opportunity—and some would argue
the duty—to use the funds in a manner that combats the very issue of the
litigation: the opioid crisis.303 If Louisiana wants a fair shot at preventing
the next addiction crisis, then it must channel the proceeds from opioid
litigation to first treat opioid addiction.304
B. Step 2: Proactively Implement MAT Programs: Mitigate and Prevent
Treatment begins with rehabilitation.305 To support public health
rehabilitation, Louisiana plaintiffs in the opioid MDL should allocate a
majority of the funds from the opioid settlement to medication-assisted
treatment (MAT) to mitigate the past and present damage that the opioid
crisis caused and to prevent future crises as well.306 MAT is considered the
most effective rehabilitation treatment for opioid-use disorders.307 MAT
combines nondrug therapies with drug therapies targeted to relieve
symptoms of opioid withdrawal and reduce the addictive effect of the
drugs.308 Treatment involves an individualized plan for each patient,
complete with counseling and cognitive-behavior therapy, because the
combination of drug therapies and behavioral-health treatment produces
298. See Weeks & Sanford, supra note 31; Medication-Assisted Treatment
Improves Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
299. See Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves Outcomes for Patients with
Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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better results for patients.309 Some examples of behavioral-health therapy
include modifying addictive behaviors, encouraging the use of nonaddictive prescription medicine, and treating patients overall mental
health. Further, MAT promotes that:
Psychosocial treatment begins with an assessment of a patient’s
psychosocial needs and the development of a patient-specific
treatment plan. Treatment may include one or more of the
following: individual or group counseling; connection to family
support systems, including family therapy; referrals to
community-based services; contingency management—an
evidence-based intervention that provides tangible rewards (often
vouchers to exchange for retail goods and services) for positive
behaviors such as abstaining from opioids; [and] mutual help
programs, such as the Narcotics Anonymous 12-step facilitation
therapy, may also be offered as an ancillary service.310
The drug therapies used in MAT include methadone, buprenorphine,
and naltrexone.311 Physicians must administer the drugs in a certified
opioid treatment program (OTP), “a facility where patients can take
medications under the supervision of staff and receive other care
services.”312 These types of facilities do not exist in many Louisiana
parishes. Clinicians can prescribe buprenorphine to treat opioid-use
disorder if they qualify for a waiver under the Drug Addiction Treatment
Act of 2000.313 As required under law, a prescriber must have psychiatric
certifications in advanced addictions or qualifications in addiction
medicine.314 If the prescriber does not have these credentials, then they can
complete an eight-hour training course.315 The course is offered online or
in person.316 Once a physician obtains the waiver, the physician can treat
addiction patients with and prescribe buprenorphine in any outpatient
practice facility.317
MAT is not readily available to Louisiana citizens because there are
very few community-based providers that offer this type of care.318 A new
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
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Louisiana treatment program has not been opened in over 10 years despite
efforts from the American Society of Addiction Medicine and the National
Council for Behavioral Health to advocate for MAT programs.319 Research
shows that MAT programs not only increase the survival rates of
individuals going through withdrawal of opioid drugs, but they also
“increas[e] the chances a person will remain in treatment and learn the
skills and build the networks necessary for long-term recovery.”320
As necessary and beneficial as MAT programs will be to Louisiana
communities, they are also costly.321 Costs of MAT include obtaining and
administering the medication used in opioid-use therapy either in an OTP
or with a buprenorphine waiver.322 The settlement proceeds will present
Louisiana with an opportunity to increase local access to MAT
programs.323 Allocating settlement funds to aid local governments in
supporting MAT would combat the rise of opioid-related overdoses in the
state.324 Thus, Louisiana local governments should assign a majority of the
settlement funds to support MAT programs.325
The main objective of local governments funding MAT should be
twofold: (1) increase the number of physicians in their parish who obtain
buprenorphine waivers and (2) use the remaining funds to supply MAT
programs with the necessary resources to be effective.326 By increasing the
number of local physicians who can prescribe buprenorphine for opioiduse disorders and by supplying funds to MAT programs, local
governments will be in a much better position to battle the opioid crisis.327
Further, MAT programs will act as safeguards against future crises.328 If
the government actively supports its citizens with well-funded public

319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
324. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
325. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
326. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
327. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
328. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
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health programs, disasters such as the opioid crisis will be much less likely
to occur.329
CONCLUSION
The opioid crisis exhausts funding in Louisiana.330 The question of
where to funnel settlement dollars will be a major issue for Louisiana
because of the varied involvement of state, city, and parish actors, as well
as the diverse range of affected populations in the state.331 Because of the
unprecedented nature of the large number of plaintiffs involved in the
opioid MDL, in addition to the state lawsuits brought against the opioid
manufacturers and distributors, uncertainty exists in the division of
potential settlement or award proceeds.332 Louisiana’s legislation on the
Tobacco MSA illustrates the state’s past practice of ignoring local
concerns and public health rehabilitation.333 A study of Louisiana’s
involvement in the tobacco settlement supports the need to be proactive
and explicit when allocating settlement funds to public health programs.334
Local governments must mandate that at least a majority of the settlement
go to treatment programs for opioid use.335 The key to successfully ending
the current crisis is to supply citizens with readily available resources to
break the cycle of addiction and prevent overdose.336 If done correctly, a
proactive implementation of a public health program may stop the next
public health crisis from occurring.337 Such an approach will save
Louisiana lives now and in the future from the dangers of opioid
addiction.338

329. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
330. LA. COMM’N ON PREVENTING OPIOID ABUSE, supra note 32.
331. Karlin, supra note 25.
332. Terry, supra note 35.
333. See generally Terry & Hoss, supra note 39.
334. Id.
335. See Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
336. Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
337. Connolly, supra note 256; Medication-Assisted Treatment Improves
Outcomes for Patients with Opioid Use Disorder, supra note 41.
338. See supra Part IV.
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